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ABSTRACT
This paper offers a simple strategic framework to help governments use 
various policy mechanisms to minimize public sector corruption. The 
paper offers a formal model that blends economics of crime models with 
identity economics and money laundering. It presents a partial equilibrium 
framework that focuses on a representative public official engaged in a mix 
of legal and illegal effort. The model introduces various levers a government 
might use to impact the costs and benefits of illegal effort. The ultimate 
goal is to help turn volatile vicious cycles of political instability, into steady 
virtuous cycles of stability, growth and sustainable development.
… corruption erodes public trust in government, affects economic development, and perpetuates conflicts. (NATO 
Building Integrity Policy, Section 8.2, 10/5/2016)
Introduction
Corruption impacts national security through multiple channels. It jeopardizes security when it places 
military forces at risk operating with inferior equipment, facilities, services, and supplies. It also weakens 
the efficiency and effectiveness of collective security agreements, such as NATO, undermining popular 
support, and damaging the credibility of alliances. Finally, the crippling economic costs of corruption, 
combined with a loss of trust in public officials, may help explain recent conflicts in the Middle East 
and Africa1 (Bellin 2013; Wolfshead, Seagev, and Sheafer 2013).
The aim of this paper is to offer a simple strategic framework to help guide governments to minimize 
public sector corruption. The paper offers a partial equilibrium framework that focuses on a represent-
ative public official engaged in a mix of legal and illegal effort. The model introduces various policy 
levers a government might use to impact the costs and benefits of illegal effort. The ultimate goal is to 
help turn volatile vicious cycles of political instability, into steady virtuous cycles of stability, growth, 
and sustainable development.
Inspiration for the model comes from a conceptual framework first proposed by one of the authors 
to guide NATO’s ‘Building Integrity Programme’ (Tagarev 2010). The model presented here combines 
four literatures. The extended model presented here combines four literatures. First, it borrows from the 
public choice ‘rent-seeking’ literature which views public officials as utility maximizers (Rose-Ackerman 
1978; Klitgaard 1988, etc.). The model itself follows closely from Becker’s work on the ‘Economics of 
Crime’ (Becker 1968, 1974; Becker and Stigler 1974; etc.) where the representative public official is 
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faced with a trade-off between expected income from criminal and non-criminal activity. It formally 
combines Becker’s model with Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000, 2005) new ‘Identity Economics.’ Finally, the 
model introduces money laundering, commonly used to ‘transform … illegally gained revenues into 
effective purchasing power’ (Masciandaro 1999, 227) which may serve as a way for corrupt gains to be 
more useful to the public official.
The paper proceeds as follows. Background section offers a brief background of the literatures on 
corruption, crime, and identity economics. Model section presents the model. Results section reviews 
the comparative statics results. Investigating money laundering section extends the model to consider 
money laundering. Conclusion section offers policy conclusions and avenues for future research.
Background
Public sector corruption threatens peace and stability in countries around the world. It erodes trust 
in governments, undermines the rule of law, and sparks violent conflicts (See Bellin 2013). Corruption 
also crushes economic growth when it damages labor productivity and deters investment (Everhart, 
Vazquez, and McNab 2009; Mendez and Sepulveda 2013). As U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, 
once observed: ‘Where economic growth … does not satisfy expectations, the potential for revolution 
or war [is] significant’ (Mattis 2010). Sadly, revolutions rarely reduce corruption. A growing literature 
suggests corruption remains a persistent threat to national and international security (Le Billon 2003; 
Tagarev 2010; Neudorfer and Theuerkauf 2014).
The literature identifies specific threats to economic well-being and national security stemming 
from public sector corruption. A hidden danger is that corruption-induced rent-seeking can lead to 
political instability which stifles investment and depress economic growth, raising unemployment and 
economic insecurity. As Krueger (1974) points out, if rent-seeking activities make ‘the market mechanism 
… suspect, the … temptation is to resort to greater and greater [state] intervention (302).’ This can lead 
to a vicious cycle as greater intervention enables more rent-seeking. Mbaku emphasizes that increasing 
state control of the economy … places under the direct control of civil servants a significant portion of national 
resources, allowing these individuals to manipulate public policy to enrich themselves at the expense of society, 
[and] politicizes resource allocation systems [to] influence distributional outcomes [so that] fewer resources are 
devoted to actual production of goods and services (199).
The newfound importance of anti-corruption efforts in the security sector is reflected in NATO’s 
landmark ‘Building Integrity Policy.’ Recently endorsed by NATO’s Heads of State, the new policy officially 
recognizes: ‘corruption and poor governance [are] security challenges [that] undermine democracy, the 
rule of law and economic development, erode public trust in defense institutions, and have a negative 
impact on operational effectiveness’ (NATO 2016).
A standard definition of public sector corruption is ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’ 
(Svensson 2005, 20). Corrupt activities that impact the security sector include: Extortion/Graft – 
Demands by public officials for payments from vendors to influence decisions on government con-
tracts; Bribery – Illegal payments/promises offered by vendors to influence public officials in charge of 
government contracts; Embezzelment – Stealing or misusing government funds, property, products, 
services, or supplies; Nepotism – Awards of special favors and/or public positions to family & friends 
based on relationships and not performance; and Patronage – Awards by elected officials of special 
favors (taxes, laws, rules, regulations, etc.) to businesses or interest groups in return for political or 
financial support.2
Rose-Ackerman (1978), Klitgaard (1988), and others view corruption as a special case of a more 
general principal–agent problem. In the case of public corruption, citizens are the principal, and the 
agents are public officials with discretion to authorize and/or enforce: public spending (contracts, 
subsidies, public–private partnerships, etc.); taxes; licenses; quotas; laws; rules & regulations. Defense 
procurement officials offer a familiar example of agents entrusted with wide discretion that can influ-
ence significant contracts.
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Where it is difficult and costly for principals to monitor agents, the risk is that an agent (public official) 
intentionally sacrifices the principal’s objectives for their own – or misuses a public office for private gain. 
The aim is to align incentives (through laws, rules, regulations, wages, promotions, punishments, etc.) to 
steer agents to engage in legal effort that supports the goals of the organization – ideally contributing 
to the public welfare3 (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Becker and Stigler 1974; Rose-Ackerman 1986).
Along these same lines, in Becker’s (1968) theory of rational crime, people decide whether or not to 
become criminals by comparing the benefits and costs of engaging in crime relative to other pursuits. 
Arguably these types of corruption are ostensibly criminal activities and can be viewed through the 
same economic framework.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) offer another mechanism to motivate employees they call ‘Identity.’ 
The authors postulate that investments to change the identity of individuals can help align incentives, 
so that ‘agents’ adopt the ‘principal’s’ goals. They claim ‘Identity is an important supplement to monetary 
compensation … ’ and offer evidence that when employees have ‘identities that lead them to behave 
… in concert with the goals of their organizations … workers are willing to put in high effort … with 
little wage variation’ (Akerlof and Kranton 2005, 11).
The authors point to the military as a particularly successful example, and cite small variations in 
wages between military grades as evidence a prime motivator to align incentives is identity and not 
wage differentials. In their view ‘inculcating in employees a sense of identity and attachment to an 
organization is critical to well-functioning enterprises’4. (Akerlof and Kranton 2005, 11).
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) refer to individuals who closely identify with their organization as 
‘insiders’ who lose utility if they stray too far from their perceived ethical or ‘ideal’ behavior. Becker (1974) 
implicitly recognizes a similar cost of engaging in corrupt effort: ‘[c]rime … has associated … psychic 
costs [and] many people do not commit crimes because they believe doing so is ethically wrong’5 (5).
Our model combines Akerlof and Kranton’s ‘Identity Economics’ with the spirit of Becker’s (1968) 
pioneering work on the ‘Economics of Crime.’ Becker’s model of rational criminal choice is based on the 
observation ‘ … individuals become criminals because of the financial … rewards from crime compared 
to legal work, taking account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of 
punishment’ (176). Following this insight, we model a representative public official as a utility maxi-
mizer whose decision to engage in legal and illegal effort depends on the expected benefits (returns) 
to each, and expected costs of illegal effort (e.g. the probability of being caught and the punishment).
In contrast to Becker and others who model a binary, mutually exclusive choice between legal or 
criminal work, public officials in our model always engage in some, if only very limited, illegal effort.6 
The model assumes officials are on a continuum – from very little to nearly exclusively illegal effort. 
This is in the spirit of the portfolio approach to crime adopted by Heineke (1978), Ehrlich (1973), and 
others. Although our representative public official derives less utility from illegal income (i.e. from their 
‘dirty’ utility function), corrupt effort nevertheless generates some utility that enters an overall ‘value 
function,’ which also includes ‘clean’ utility from legal effort. The aim is to nudge those on the margin 
into more legal effort and less illegal effort.
The comparative statics results from the partial equilibrium framework developed in this paper are 
intended as a first step to help shape government investments to minimize corruption. Subsequent 
studies will explore the societal costs of corruption, and attempt to explicitly model the government’s 
optimization problem in combating corruption. The ultimate goal is to investigate opportunities for 
countries to align incentives faced by utility-maximizing public officials, to minimize public sector 
corruption.
The model below focuses on strategies to reduce the relative benefits from corrupt effort, and/or raise 
the expected costs. Results of the model suggest governments have multiple options to raise expected 
costs. These can be distilled into two main strategies: (i) building integrity or ‘identity’ (e.g. teaching 
ethics, codes of conduct, etc., and other training that reduces an individual’s utility from ill-gotten 
gains); and (ii) building institutions: (a) to increase transparency (e.g. investments in accounting, public 
budgeting, inventory control systems, independent audits, a free press, etc., that raise the probability of 
detection, and the probability of apprehension given detection); and (b) to improve accountability (e.g. 
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investments in an honest judiciary and trustworthy legal system that raises the probability of conviction 
given apprehension, and the consequences – fines/penalties – if convicted).7
The Model
The model presented in this section adopts a microeconomic, partial equilibrium, rational actor 
approach. It focuses on a representative public official with a finite quantity of total ‘effort’ (ET) availa-
ble in any period (say a 40 h work week), to allocate between legal effort, E ≥ 0, and illegal (or corrupt) 
effort, e ≥ 0, such that: E + e = ET.
The marginal returns (e.g. wages) associated with each type of effort are taxed in the case of legal 
effort, WE(1 – t), and tax free for illegal/corrupt effort, We. After-tax legal income is, Y0 = WEE(1 – t), and 
illegal/dirty income is, Y1 = Wee. However, whereas the return to legal effort is certain, Y0, returns to illegal 
income are uncertain in that they depend on whether or not illegal effort is detected and punished.
The expected returns from illegal income, E(Y1), depend on returns under two states of nature: not 
detected, YND = (1 – P)Y1, and detected, YD = P(Y1 – F(Y1)); where P is the probability of detection, appre-
hension and conviction, and F(Y1) = γWee is the penalty/fine if convicted (where γ ∊ (0, 1)).8 Expected 
dirty income from corrupt effort can therefore be written as:
 
where, 0 < (1 − P훾) < 1, is the marginal change in expected (disposable) dirty income, E(Y1), from any 
change in corrupt income earned from illegal effort, Y1.
Following Becker (1968) we assume a person commits an illegal act if the expected utility of doing 
so exceeds the expected utility of not doing so. The value function includes ‘clean’ utility derived from 
legal income, U0(Y0), and ‘dirty’ utility from expected illegal income, U1(E(Y1)).
9 Our representative public 
official selects an optimal mix of efforts (E*, e*) > 0 to maximize the additively separable ‘value’ function 
of their two income streams:
subject to the overall effort constraint,
From Equation (2), the public official’s overall value function consists of two components: a ‘clean’ 
utility function, and a ‘dirty’ (expected) utility function. For ease of exposition, we assume constant 
marginal utility of income associated with legal effort. The ‘clean’ utility function is assumed linear and 
risk neutral such that:
In contrast, the dirty expected utility function, U1(E(Y1)) includes two key parameters b1 and β:
The first parameter, the multiplicative fraction b1 ∈ (0, 1), reflects losses in purchasing power (relative to 
clean income) associated with dirty income i.e. a more restrictive set of consumption choices is available 
to spend dirty money. The second parameter is the identity variable, 훽 ∈ (0, 1).
In our model, (1 – β) provides a rate at which the public official discounts the value they receive from 
dirty income and the rate at which the public official experiences diminishing returns to dirty income. 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2005) first introduced the concept of ‘social category’ through a parameter 
(β) in which individuals in an organization either identify as an ‘insider’ (if β = 1), or ‘outsider’ (if β = 0). In 
contrast to Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 14) streamlined model which assumes a binary choice of social 
category, our model allows the possibility a public official is on a spectrum anywhere between β = 0 
(zero identity, or complete outsider), and β = 1 (100% identity, or complete insider).10
(1)E(Y1) = (1 − P)(Wee) + P(Wee − 훾Wee) = (1 − P훾)Wee = (1 − P훾)Y1,
(2)V (E , e) = U0(Y0) + U1(E(Y1)),
(3)E + e = ET .
(4)U0(Y0) = b0Y0, with constant marginal utility of income, b0 ≥ 1.
(5)U1(E(Y1)) = b1(1 − 훽)[(1 − P훾)Y1]
(1−훽); where U1(E(Y1)) ≥ 0 => (P훾 ≤ 1).
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In Equation (5), the more a public official relates as an insider, the less utility they derive from any 
expected illegal income: ‘A person who identifies with … a social category [as an “insider”] … loses 
utility to the extent she does not act in the best interests of the organization.’ (Akerlof and Kranton 
2005, 13) Introducing the term (1 – 훽) in the dirty utility function in (5), ensures the greater a public 
official’s identity/integrity, the greater the diminishing returns and overall losses in utility they derive 
from illegal income.11
In the extreme case where incentives are perfectly aligned, or where investments in screening, 
selection, retention, training, team building, etc., to build identity/integrity are successful such that 
public officials completely identify with their government roles and responsibilities, they are 100% 
insiders (β = 1), and from (5) derive no utility from expected dirty income, i.e. U1(E(Y1)) = 0, and con-
sequently engage exclusively in legal effort. However, our focus is on public officials with degrees of 
identity in the range 0 < 훽 < 1. In our model, a representative public official selects an optimum mix of 
legal and illegal effort to maximize utility of their two income streams given by (4) and (5), combined 
in the value function:
The next section discusses the results of the model.
Results
The aim is to develop a simple strategic framework to investigate opportunities for countries 
to align incentives faced by utility maximizing public officials in their cost-benefit calculations 
between legal and corrupt effort (i.e. ‘the misuse of public office for private gain’). The literature 
on the economics of crime urges governments to develop policies so that ‘crime does not pay.’ This 
paper offers a broad range of policies aimed at minimizing corruption. The goal is to make crime 
(illegal/corrupt effort) relatively less attractive on the margin, in terms of benefits and costs – i.e. 
to minimize corruption by nudging public officials toward a more societally desirable mix of legal 
and illegal/corrupt effort.
A representative public official’s decision to distribute productive labor between legal effort (E) and 
illegal effort (e) depends on several variables. These include: (i) their inherent willingness to engage in 
illegal effort – colored by ‘culture,’ and inversely correlated with their ‘integrity’ or ‘identity’ (β); (ii) the 
probability of detection, apprehension, and conviction (P); (iii) the punishment if convicted (F); and (iv) 
relative marginal returns from legal effort (WE(1 – t)), and illegal effort (We).
Since a goal of this study is to provide a foundation and framework for future modeling efforts and 
empirical analyses, the comparative statics results offer valuable insights. They offer a first step to help 
shape government policies to influence public officials to increase legal effort, E*, and reduce illegal 
effort, e*.
From (2′), (3), (4), and (5), a representative public official’s optimization can be expressed as the 
unconstrained optimization:
The first order necessary condition for a maximum is:
which yields optimum legal effort:
Since, VEE < 0, the first order condition is both necessary and sufficient for a maximum.12
(2*)V (E , e) = b0Y0 + b1(1 − 훽)[(1 − P훾)Y1]
(1−훽).
(6)MaxV (E) = b0Y0 + b1(1 − 훽)[(1 − P훾)Y1]
(1−훽)
(7)VE = b0WE(1 − t) − b1(1 − 훽)
2[(1 − P훾)We(E
T − E)](−훽)(1 − P훾)We = 0,
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The table above reports comparative statics results of increases in the model parameters on optimum 
illegal/corrupt effort, e* = ET – E*, and on the overall value (utility) achieved at the maximum, V*.13 The 
derivation of these results is available in greater detail in Appendix 1.
Bolded parameters along the top row in Table 1 indicate possible counter-corruption investment 
opportunities (i.e. government decision variables) available to nudge public officials to reduce public 
sector corruption. The results of the model can be interpreted in terms of two sets of parameters: those 
that raise the expected costs (and/or reduce the utility of corrupt efforts), and those that lower the 
relative benefits (and/or the utility of illegal efforts).
Signs for the first set of parameters (훽, P, 훾) are as expected, and represent opportunities to increase 
the expected costs of corrupt effort. Building integrity (i.e. increasing identity, 훽), increasing transparency 
(i.e. increasing the probability of detection, P), and improving accountability (i.e. increasing the conse-
quences, 훾), each have the desired impact of ‘minimizing corruption’ – i.e. reducing optimal illegal effort, 
e* (and boosting optimal legal effort, E*). Although having the desired effect on illegal/corrupt effort, 
since dirty income also contributes to overall utility, increasing any of the three parameters reduces 
overall utility, V*.
The second set of parameters (WE, We, t, b0, b1) represent opportunities to reduce (increase) relative 
benefits of illegal (legal) effort. As expected, government actions that reduce the returns to illegal effort, 
We, or restrict the purchasing power/utility of illegal income (i.e. reduce the fraction, b1), will reduce 
optimal illegal effort e* (and boost optimal legal effort, E*). Since the mix of efforts at the optimum gen-
erates some dirty income that contributes to overall utility, on the margin, these actions also reduce V*.
Conversely, increasing the returns to legal effort (i.e. by raising wages, WE, reducing tax burdens, t, or 
somehow increasing the marginal utility of legal effort, b0), increases optimal legal effort E*, and reduces 
illegal effort, e*. Predictably, overall utility, V*, rises with increases in WE or b0, and with reductions in t. 
Finally, any exogenous increase in total effort available, ET, increases both legal and illegal effort at the 
optimum, and overall utility, V*.
Investigating Money Laundering
Introducing money laundering offers a novel extension of the model. It presents a realistic option 
that exists for public officials to ‘transform illegally gained revenues into effective purchasing power.’ 
(Masciandro 1999, 227) For a price, laundered dirty income enters the overall value function as a third 
revenue stream that offers a similar set of consumption choices to legal income, and therefore greater 
utility than dirty income (Ferwada 2009).
Another novel extension is to combine money laundering with identity economics (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005), Laundered dirty income is depreciated based on a public official’s degree of ‘identity.’ 
The more committed an official is as an ‘insider’ who identifies with their organization the less utility 
they derive from illegal income, and laundered money.
For ease of exposition, the assumption is that public officials launder an exogenous fraction, 
∝ ∊ [0, 1), 14 of dirty income, Y1 = Wee. But laundering is not free. It involves marginal transaction costs, 
c ∊ [0, 1), driven in part by anti-money laundering legislation and enforcement actions.15 Laundered 
dirty income is given by: Y2 = (1 − c) ∝ Y1.
Since laundered income can only be enjoyed if illegal effort is not detected (i.e. with probability 
(1 – P)), the expected income from laundering, E(Y2), depends on the fraction (∝ ) of expected corrupt 
income (Y1) laundered when illegal effort is not detected that remains after being converted at marginal 
cost, c. Expected laundered income is given by:
Table 1. Comparative static results.




 > 0 t∈ (0, 1) ET > 0  b
0
≥ 1  b
1
∈ (0, 1)
V* – – – + + – + + +
e* – – – – + + + – +
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Similar to dirty money, the utility of laundered money is depreciated based on a public official’s 
degree of ‘identity.’ The utility of laundered dirty income can therefore be expressed as:
If illegal income is indistinguishable from legal income (see Masciandaro 1999, 227), then there is 
no loss in purchasing power associated with spending laundered income, and b2 = 1. As in the case 
of the dirty utility function given by (5), the greater a public official’s identity/integrity, the lower their 
utility from laundered income. The more an individual ‘identifies’ with their organization, the greater the 
identity/integrity parameter 훽 ∈ (0, 1), which is reflected in (10) as diminishing returns and reductions 
in overall utility derived from laundered income.16
Introducing money laundering requires an adjustment of Equation (1) to capture the expected 
income from illegal effort that remains after laundering (i.e. expected ‘net dirty money’). Assuming as 
before that penalties, F(Wee) imposed with probability, P, for illegal effort apply to all illegal income, 
Wee, then only in the case of ‘not detected’ (with probability (1 – P)) is laundering successful, and the 
exogenous fraction of laundered money subtracted from illegal income, i.e. ‘net dirty money’ remaining 
is (Wee− ∝ Wee). The result is the following modification of Equation (1), expected dirty money:
The term, z1, represents the marginal change in expected dirty income, E(Y1), from any change in corrupt 
income earned from illegal effort, Y1 = Wee.17 As before, the utility of expected dirty income is given by:
A public official’s objective is to find an optimal mix of efforts (E*, e*) > 0 that maximizes their value 
function, V(E,e), subject to the overall effort constraint (3). The value function now consists of the sum 
of: utility from legal income, U0(Y0) given by (4), utility from ‘dirty’ income, U1(E(Y1)) given by (5′), and 
utility from ‘cleaned’ (laundered) income, U2 (E(Y2)) given by (9), or:
Alternatively, from (3), (4), (5′), and (10), a representative public official’s optimization can be expressed 
as the unconstrained optimization:
The first order necessary condition for a maximum is:
and since VEE  <  0, the first order condition given by (7′) is both necessary and sufficient for a 
maximum.18
The comparative statics results reported in Table 1 mostly persist with money laundering. Increases in 
the model parameters continue to have the expected impact on optimum illegal/corrupt effort, e* = 
ET – E*, and on the overall Value at the maximum, V* (now given by (6′)). Also as expected, raising the 
transaction costs of money laundering, c, at the optimum, has the desired effect of reducing illegal 
effort, e*, and reduces overall utility, V*. A more detailed discussion of the results is presented below.
Working our way across the partial derivative results in Table 1 from left to right yields the following 
interpretations:
(9)E(Y2) = (1 − P)(1 − c) ∝ Wee = z2Y1; where E(Y2) ≥ 0 => 0 ≤ z2 = (1 − P)(1 − c) ∝< 1.
(10)U2(E(Y2)) = b2(1 − 훽)[(1 − P)(1 − c) ∝ WeeY1]
(1−훽) = b2(1 − 훽)[z2Y1]
(1−훽).
(1′)E(Y1) = [(1 − P)(Wee− ∝ Wee) + P(Wee − 훾Wee)] = [1 − (1 − P) ∝ −P훾]Y1 = z1Y1
(5′)U1(E(Y1)) = b1(1 − 훽)[z1Y1](1−훽) where U1(E(Y1)) ≥ 0 => 0 ≤ z1 = [1 − (1 − P) ∝ −P훾] < 1.
(2′)V (E , e) = U0(Y0) + U1(E(Y1)) + U2(E(Y2)),
(6′)MaxV (E) = b0Y0 + b1(1 − 훽)[z1Y1](1−훽) + b2(1 − 훽)[z2Y1](1−훽)
(7′)VE = b0WE(1 − t) − (1 − 훽)2[We(ET − E)](−훽)We[b1z1(1−훽) + b2z(1−훽)2 ] = 0,
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(A)  Parameters that impact expected costs and the utility of corrupt effort
(i)  Building Integrity (훽): Strategic investments to build the integrity or ‘identity’ of public officials 
(i.e. to encourage a stronger commitment to public service)19 are reflected in a higher degree of 
identity captured in the parameter, 훽. Building integrity/identity decreases the utility of corrupt 
and laundered income. As expected, an increase in 훽 around the optimum reduces the optimal 
amount of corrupt effort (e*), and consequently increases legal effort. As 훽 increases, this also 
reduces ‘dirty’ utility received from corrupt effort, and the utility of any laundered income, which 
(ceteris paribus) lowers overall utility given by the value function, V*.
(ii)  Increasing Transparency and Improving Accountability (P, 훾, c). Strategic investments to increase 
the probability of conviction (P) can be broken into a multiplicative product of three components: 
(i) increasing the probability of detection, (ii) increasing the probability of apprehension given 
detection (e.g. arrest rates), and (iii) increasing the probability of conviction given apprehension 
(e.g. conviction rates).20 The first two probability components (detection and apprehension) 
are impacted by strategies to increase ‘transparency,’ whereas the last (conviction), along with 
the penalty parameter (훾), reflect investments in ‘accountability.’21 (See Tagarev 2010, Chap 2). 
As expected, investments to increase Transparency (P) or improve Accountability (훾) increase 
the probability bad behavior is detected, and that corrupt officials are apprehended, convicted 
and punished, which reduces illegal effort (e*). It also reduces expected corrupt income that 
enters the ‘dirty’ utility function and potential laundered income, which (ceteris paribus) lowers 
overall utility from the value function, V*. Similarly, increasing the transaction costs (c) involved 
in money laundering reduces returns from illegal effort, and therefore also, e*. It also reduces 
the value of any expected laundered income that enters the ‘dirty’ utility function, which (ceteris 
paribus) lowers V*.
(B)  Parameters that impact expected benefits and the utility of legitimate effort
Efficiency wages that raise WE, and tax policy that lowers t. The results of the model support the obser-
vation that: ‘If civil service salaries [WE] are relatively low, then more of the returns to bureaucratic 
positions may be derived from external activities [e*].’ (Mbaku 1998, 194) Conversely, any intervention 
that increases after tax legal income (WE), or lowers tax-free illegal (corrupt) income (We), increases 
relative returns to legitimate effort, and therefore reduces optimal expected benefits of corrupt effort, 
e*. However, since the model assumes no public official is perfect (all engage in some if only very 
limited/minor illegal effort), whereas increasing legal returns, WE, and lowering taxes, t, increases 
overall utility, V*, reducing illegal returns, We, reduces overall utility since (ceteris paribus) it lowers 
the (however small) utility derived from illegal effort.
Conclusion
This paper combines several literatures to develop a simple probabilistic optimization framework to help 
minimize public sector corruption. The model combines the economics of crime, identity economics, 
and money laundering. In the spirit of the public choice rent-seeking literature, the model treats public 
officials as utility maximizers that conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine how much to engage 
(or not) in illegal/corrupt effort.
The model postulates a representative public official that decides on an optimum mix of legal and 
illegal effort to maximize their ‘value function.’ The value function consists of two additively separable 
components: a dirty utility function for corrupt income, and a clean utility function for legal and laun-
dered income. The aim is to explore ways to increase the expected costs, and/or reduce relative benefits, 
of corrupt effort. Rather than treating corruption as binary – where individuals engage in either legal or 
illegal effort – corruption in the model is treated along a spectrum, as something that can be reduced 
(minimized) through various policy levers, but not eliminated.
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The comparative statics results suggest governments have a variety of options to raise expected 
costs/penalties. These can be distilled into three main investment strategies: (i) building integrity or 
‘identity’ (e.g. ethics, codes of conduct, and other training that reduces the utility of ill-gotten gains); (ii) 
increasing transparency (e.g. investments in accounting, inventory control systems, competitive tenders, 
independent audits, etc., that raise the probability of detection, and the probability of apprehension 
given detection); and (iii) improving accountability (e.g. an honest and trustworthy judicial/legal system 
that raises the probability of conviction given apprehension, and consequences if convicted).22
The results also suggest building integrity/identity – i.e. increasing ‘psychic costs,’ or the ethical and 
moral burden, of corrupt effort – could be a valuable complement to any initiative that raises expected 
penalties. Other strategies could focus on reducing the relative benefits of corrupt effort. These include: 
(i) reducing tax and regulatory burdens on legal effort, and (ii) improving public sector compensation, 
or offering ‘efficiency wages.’ Ideally, culturally appropriate mixes of strategies could be designed for 
each country to promote a virtuous cycle: whereby reducing corruption contributes to peace & political 
stability, expanding trade and investment, boosting productivity, increasing job opportunities, incomes, 
and economic growth, generating even greater peace & stability.
Future extensions of the model could treat government strategies to minimize corruption endoge-
nously within a game theory framework. The government could then select an optimal mix of invest-
ments to minimize corruption, subject to efficiency and effectiveness constraints, and the response of 
a representative public official. In this case, facing government anti-corruption initiatives, the public 
official would not only identify an optimal mix of legal and illegal effort that maximizes utility, but could 
also engage in efforts to reduce probabilities of detection, apprehension, and conviction. Finally, future 
studies might explore implications of alternative risk aversion assumptions in public officials’ utility 
functions, and develop a multiperiod dynamic model to offer additional insights into how governments 
might optimally control corruption over time.
Notes
1.  In reviewing common characteristics of countries with the highest levels of corruption, Svensson (2005) finds 
that ‘all are developing or transition countries’ and that ‘with few exceptions, the most corrupt countries have low 
income levels [and] are considered closed economies.’ (24).
2.  These also coincide well with the Transparency International (See Transparency International’s 2013 ‘Government 
Defence Anti-Corruption Index’ http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/gi-2013-mainreportphase04.pdf).
3.  Note that Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), Transparency International, and others have found that excessive laws, 
rules, and regulations actually promote corruption (i.e. excessive red tape promotes bribery and extortion). A 
recent econometric study concludes: ‘We do not need more regulation, but smart regulation … adapted to local 
conditions, and a reduction in rent-seeking opportunities provided by regulation … ’ (Mungiu-Pippidi and Kossow 
2016) Another challenge for governments is to deter corruption in the most benign way possible to preserve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of organizations. While neither of these issues is explicitly addressed in this paper, 
they offer important avenues for future research.
4.  The authors conclude: 
If inculcating identity is cheap, if there is much uncertainty, if workers’ effort is hard to observe, if output depends 
upon special exertion at peak times, if workers are especially risk averse, if high effort is critical to the organization’s 
output, we would expect a firm to find it more profitable to use an identity-oriented incentive scheme. (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2005, 15)
5.  Block and Heineke (1975) extend Becker’s framework to explicitly include ethical costs of crime.
6.  Public officials in our model engage along a continuum of legal and illegal effort. For example office supplies 
‘borrowed’ from work and used at home for personal use could be considered a minor form of illegal effort 
(embezzlement) … resulting in modest savings (benefits) to the individual, and involving limited risk (expected 
costs/penalties). In contrast to Becker and others who model a binary and mutually exclusive choice of legal or 
illegal activity, and focus on finding corner solutions where policing and punishment eliminates corrupt effort 
(such that ‘crime does not pay’), our model views public officials more pragmatically. The goal is to nudge those 
on the margin into more legal effort and less illegal effort.
7.  The NATO Building Integrity framework similarly views public officials as utility maximizers that evaluate costs and 
benefits of engaging in corrupt activities. Citing two eminent philosophers, Emmanual Kant and John Stuart Mill, the 
framework principally focuses on increasing the costs of corrupt efforts. This can be accomplished in two ways: By 
increasing the moral burden of bad behavior (Kant), or the expected penalties (Mill). Expected penalties consist of 
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two components: the probability of detection, and the consequences. ‘Building Integrity’ increases the moral costs 
of corrupt actions. Raising expected penalties requires some combination of ‘Increasing Transparency’ – increasing 
the probability of detection, and ‘Improving Accountability’ – increasing the consequences (Tagarev 2010).
8.  We assume the fine, F(.), is monotonic increasing in corrupt earnings, and if a penalty includes incarceration, that 
this could be monetized as the discounted present value of any lost wages or other possible income-generating 
opportunities.
9.  A third possible revenue stream – ‘clean’ utility from laundered dirty income – is introduced later.
10.  ‘When the agent sees herself as an insider, she maximizes her identity utility by exerting … high effort … ’ ‘When 
an agent sees herself as an outsider, she requires a higher wage differential to compensate her … ’ (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005, 15) In our model, the more a public official relates as an insider, the greater (relative) utility they 
derive from legal income, and the less from expected illegal income.
11.  The diminishing returns to corrupt income captures Akerlof and Kranton’s (2005) notion of an ‘ideal.’ The authors 
postulate that the further an individual strays from their notion of an ‘ideal,’ the less utility they derive from any given 
effort: ‘ … workers have an ideal level of effort [and] lose utility insofar as they deviate from this ideal’ (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005, 24). We expect that the more an individual cares about this ideal (i.e. the more they are an insider) 
the less utility of income they enjoy from engaging in additional illegal activity. Thus as illegal income increases, 
the utility from dirty income diminishes at the rate of (1 – β).
12.  From the Implicit function theorem, totally differentiating (7) at the optimum (letting V
E
 = U(E*,k) = 0), yields dE/
dk = –Uk/UE Ξ ∂E*/∂k, which reveals the marginal change in optimal legal effort with respect to a change in any 
parameter, k (where UE = VEE < 0). From the Envelope Theorem (Silberg 1978, 168–171), taking partial derivatives 
of (6), the objective function, with respect to any parameter, k, yields the change in the overall value function, V*, 
with respect to a change in k. Detailed calculations are available upon request.
13.  Note the comparative statics for illegal/corrupt effort, e*, are easily obtained for any parameter, k, by simply 
switching the signs for E*, since from (2), e*=E T – E*, implies ∂e*/∂k = –∂E*/∂k (for all k ≠ ET).
14.  The model becomes significantly more complex if the fraction of laundered income is treated as a second decision 
variable and the comparative static results remain largely unchanged. Maximizing the value function (6′) for alpha 








. We will more explicitly explore these ideas in future research.
15.  One can think of transaction costs as including the costs of avoiding detection. A useful extension of the model 
could unbundle the transaction cost, c, to include explicit assessment of a new risk being introduced. That 
associated with the probability of detection and punishment not just from illegal effort, but now also from money 
laundering (See Ferwada 2009).
16.  Note that in the best case, where β = 1, a public official is a fully committed (100%) insider who completely identifies 
with goals of the organization, so that incentives to serve the public are perfectly aligned. In this case the individual 
derives no utility from either dirty money or laundered income, leaving clean money (after-tax legal income) as 
the only revenue stream that generates any utility.
17.  Note that for an increase in the probability of detection to reduce the marginal change in expected dirty income 
remaining after laundering, E(Y
1




∕휕P = (∝ −훾) < 0, this requires 훾 > ∝  (i.e. the fractional 
penalty is greater than the exogenous fraction laundered). This is not necessary for the overall effect on dirty effort 
to be negative, however, as increasing P also decreases the money available to launder, as our representative public 
official only has the option to launder if undetected.
18.  From the Implicit function theorem, totally differentiating (7′) at the optimum (letting V
E
 = U(E*, k) = 0), yields dE/
dk = Uk/UE. Ξ ∂E*/∂k, or the marginal change in optimal legal effort with respect to a change in any parameter, k 
(where UE = VEE < 0). Note that for all k ≠ (b0,WE , t), ∂E*/∂k = −[Uz1 (휕z1∕휕k) + Uz2 (휕z2∕휕k)∕UE ). From the Envelope 
Theorem (Silberg 1978, 168–171), taking partial derivatives of (6′), the objective function, with respect to any 
parameter, k, yields the change in the overall value function, V*, with respect to a change in k.
19.  ‘The lack of commitment to public service has been cited as an important determinant of the pervasiveness of 
corruption in the bureaucracies of many developing countries. In many of these economies … public service is 
seen as an opportunity of personal enrichment.’ ‘An important implication … is that … positions in the civil service 
be awarded only to individuals who have the ability to efficiently perform … duties … and not as political rewards 
or in exchange for bribes … ’ (Mbaku 1998, 204) This argues for screening, selection and retention/promotion 
decisions based more on merit and less on political connections.
20.  Interestingly, Andreoni (1991) and others find that raising expected penalties may reduce the probabilities of 
apprehension, and of conviction given apprehension. The former is attributed to more effort made to avoid 
detection and apprehension, while the latter is attributed both to greater spending to avoid conviction by the 
criminal, and also to a juror’s threshold level of reasonable doubt rising with the degree of punishment. Not wanting 
to make a type I error and convict an innocent man when penalties are particularly harsh, they may instead be 
more accepting of a type II error, allowing a guilty man to go free.
21.  Law enforcement typically consists of four systems designed to: (i) monitor violations of the law, (ii) identify and 
arrest offenders, (iii) assess guilt, and (iv) administer punishments.
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22.  Under certain conditions, raising the cost of money laundering, particularly in conjunction with increased 
transparency and accountability, could also be used to reduce corrupt effort.
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Appendix 1
This Appendix demonstrates the derivation of the key results for our model presented in Model section and Results section. 
Starting from our unconstrained optimization given in (6), 
The first order necessary condition for a maximum is:
Yielding optimum legal effort: 
All comparative statics for E∗ were derived using the Implicit Function Theorem, totally differentiating 
(6) at the optimum (letting VE = U(E*, k) = 0), yields dE/dk  = −Uk/UE Ξ ∂E*/∂k, which reveals the marginal 
change in optimal legal effort with respect to a change in any parameter, k (where UE = VEE < 0). Below, 
we show the resulting partial derivatives for parameters under the government’s control, 훽 , P, 훾, WE, and 
t, and the direction of their impact.
First we take the partial derivative of (7) with respect to E:
Then, using the implicit function theorem we can establish:
(6)Max V (E) = b0Y0 + b1(1 − 훽)[(1 − P훾)Y1](1−훽)
(7)VE = b0WE (1 − t) − b1(1 − 훽)2[(1 − P훾)We(ET − E)](−훽)(1 − P훾)We = 0
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For comparative statics on V, using the envelope theorem we can establish that: 
These results, along with results that demonstrate the impact of changes in all parameters effecting V 
and E, are summarized in Table 1 in the paper.
V = b
0
WE (1 − t)E
∗ + b
1












































(1 − t)E > 0
휕V
휕t
= −b
0
wEE < 0
